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The question of aggregate welfare over time makes business cycle studies 
important. Finance studies allocation of resources under uncertainty. Thus 
both these fields of study dwell on intertemporal resource allocation under 
uncertainty. This paper attempts to shed light on how finance can be 
integrated into business cycle theory to provide richer and deeper insights 
than the standard real business cycle theory. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
Fluctuations in aggregate economic activity have accompanied market economies 
throughout history. The recessions have been severely disruptive in many cases causing 
widespread unemployment, and have slowed down the long run capital accumulation 
process by hurting demand conditions, and the profitability expectations of the firms. 
Neither the labourer, not the owner of capital likes recessions though they do not mind 
boom conditions. But overall they are better served with a steady growth path of the 
economy with less uncertainty and fear afflicting them in the short run. The birth and 
continuation of stabilization policy has to be understood in this context. It must be 
admitted however, that the warranted stabilization policy prescribed under different 
circumstances and in different times and places have covered a wide-ranging proposals 
generating a lack of consensus on the theory of such policy. The debate that took off 
since the publication of General Theory in 1936, has never really cooled down though the 
mainstream literature today is dominated by the models which are the descendants of new 
classical macroeconomics. Lucas has observed (1987) that costs of business cycles were 
insignificant with a hands off approach taken by macro-policy makers and stability in the 
monetary aggregates. This has not only stimulated further theoretical and empirical 
studies to prove or disprove him, but also challenged new-Keynesian theorists to provide 
robust micro-foundations for a structure that can generate their essential propositions.  
 
Finance studies the allocation of resources under uncertainty where some agents in the 
economy contract to acquire money from others subject to certain conditions of 
repayment. The analysis can be in a bilateral setting, partial equilibrium setting or a 
general equilibrium setting. The subject becomes interesting due to the element of 
uncertainty regarding future repayment. This uncertainty affects the intertemporal 
allocation of resources apart from the intra-temporal allocation. Therefore it raises the 
issue whether finance has a connection with intertemporal (macroeconomic) fluctuations 
in output, investment and employment. The purpose of this paper is to explore this 
connection with the final aim of enriching our theory of business cycles. I think it is the 
most logical way to understand recent financial and real economic crises in developed as 
well as the emerging markets of the modern world economy. 
 
The next section of the paper is concerned with an analysis of the state of the art business 
cycle theory with due recognition to the alternative approaches. Next we examine the 
subject of finance and analyze different financial mechanisms built in business cycles. 
The last section concludes. 
  
Section 2. Data and Theories of Business Cycle  
2.1 Data 
Ultimately a theory has to be confronted with the real world data. Theoretical modeling 
may have a better chance of passing the empirical test if introspection and abstraction at 
the initial stages is accompanied by a sense of the statistical results concerning growth 
and volatility rates of the vector of aggregate variables, and a knowledge about the 
variance-covariance matrix of these variables.  While ideally one should have data over 
the cross section of market economies world wide, data sets are neither complete nor 
available everywhere. USA is the leading source not only in terms of its long historical 
association with the market experiment but also because it has a better data set than many 
of the European market economies. For this reason, here I limit myself to a discussion on 
the USA data with some observations on the experience of some of the other market 
economies.  
 
Fluctuations have been more pronounced and usually more persistent in the 19th and early 
20th century USA especially till the end of the Great Depression. Financial crises like 
endemic bank runs and stock market crashes were also associated with the early 
fluctuations. Higher growth rate associated with low amplitude and a tendency towards 
low frequency business cycles followed in the next thirty years1. The oil shocks and 
stagflation experience of the early 1970s caused a sharp and deep recession in the 
advanced Western market economies like USA and created a resource bottleneck 
awareness not only in empirical macroeconomics but also in it’s theoretical counterpart. 
The 1980s was a prosperous decade during which growth rate again rose. However, 
during the same period some bank failures occurred which had spillovers in financial 
markets and household welfare and savings decisions. The 1987 stock market crash was 
sharp and deep and created large wealth effects but did not lead to a systemic crash and a 
prolonged recession.  The 1990s was the age of IT revolution with tremendous progress, 
wealth accumulation and regime shift in data communications and processing 
technology. It was accompanied by a restructuring of the economy as individuals and 
                                                 
1
 One reason for the regime shifts in business cycles has been the associated shifts in policy. For example, 
monetary disturbance was a significant factor in the early times and was correlated with national income 
variability as well as persistence; but since the emergence of Federal Reserve and it’s stabilizing monetary 
policy through such means as  inflation targeting, such disturbances have caused a different pattern of 
correlations. The same argument goes for fiscal policy. However, there are other important factors behind 
the shifts like institutional changes and learning dynamics (both of the public and the policy maker). 
firms became more oriented around the new technology and it’s growth as well 
networked with each other. Venture capital experiments together with adoption of 
innovations and a big R&D policy in large service industry and technology firms further 
accelerated the process of capital stock accumulation as well redefining capital. 
Technology finance came of age in the natural process given the demand of the times.  
 
In 1997 the Asian financial and real economic crisis shook some of the financial 
institutions like hedge funds in the US but the real sector kept progressing, in 2001 the 
dotcom bubble burst in the USA and was a major setback to the financial sector. Focus 
had shifted on containing dangerous bubbles in asset markets but the real estate bubble 
and the race for securitization was gradually taking place. When the bubble burst and 
defaults and foreclosure started, the subprime crisis hit in 2007. In 2008 the investment 
banking industry was found sitting with worthless securitized assets and a major financial 
crisis started whose end we have not seen till today. 
 
Coming back to volatility and covariance we generally get the following picture: 
Investment is most volatile followed by hours and output while consumption is relatively 
smooth. Investment, employment and asset prices are pro-cyclical, wages are acyclical, 
and  interest rates  and productivity are countercyclical.   
 
2.2 Real Business Cycle Theory : insights, reflections and discontents 
Modern macroeconomics is based on two paradigms – the infinite horizon representative 
agent model and the overlapping generations model. The former is most suitable for 
business cycle analysis and here we shall restrict our discussion to it. The infinite horizon 
Representative Agent (RA) model is a typical abstraction from differences across 
individuals in terms of tastes, technologies, information and endowments that is the 
starting point of trading models of general equilibrium. Instead, the RA model focuses on 
how the economy represented by a single agent adjusts to shocks and whether the 
observed pattern of co-movements between macroeconomic variables are generated by 
the model. Another issue is the degree of persistence of shocks, how much time does an 
economy take to recover from a negative shock? The specification of shocks can vary but 
typically shocks are assumed to hit the production process: they are technological or 
productivity related in nature. The optimal growth model under uncertainty was amended 
and developed by Kydland. and Prescott (1982) and Long. and Plosser (1983) to fit US 
business cycle facts by calibrating the model with values of parameters based on past US 
data and simulating the model on computer by writing and running a software 
programme like FORTRAN. The Lucasian (see Lucas (1972), (1987)) insight is that 
business cycles are optimal response of the economy to the shocks produced by a 
stochastic process, and that, therefore, cyclical movements perse do not warrant any 
intervention. Strange as it may seem to old fashioned macroeconomists or dyed in the 
wool Keynesians, the insight is important and deserves merit and attention. First of all, 
the focus on the welfare or normative side of the business cycles together with positive 
questions is an important step in macroeconomics. Second is the recognition of the 
recursive nature of the macroeconomic problem, that is at each point of time we are 
confronted with same conceptual situation of an infinite horizon where the state variables 
are the current vector of shocks and the economy wide capital stock and control variables 
are savings and labour choice. This has created a methodological revolution by bringing 
in the toolkit of dynamic programming which is used to determine the policy functions 
and characterize the optimal path of the endogenous state variables (see Stokey and 
Lucas with Prescott (1989)). Thus a shock is optimally transmitted through the capital 
accumulation process and can slow it down. 
 
However, there are several problems with the RA model. One is that intertemporal 
labour-leisure tradeoffs in reaction to shocks are much less in practice and cannot be said 
to really create fluctuation in output and labour hours. The natural reaction is to offer 
models of labour market which are not clearing with demand constraints playing a role. 
While this appeals to intuition, it is not easy to replace the equilibriating model with a 
rationing one where the latter is not adhoc to some extent. However, the most important 
point to observe in this context is that if the labour-leisure supply side tradeoff story fails 
to create plausible mechanisms of intertemporal fluctuations, then the only candidate left 
is the demand for labour and therefore a role for firms.  
  
Another criticism is the notion that a representative agent model does not capture the 
trading problems that arise in an economy and create self fulfilling equilibria some of 
which may be associated with aggregate levels of low output, investment and hours 
worked. This could happen due to strategic complementarities present between different 
sectors, or in a model which allows for simultaneous rationing of the labour market and 
goods market producing a Barro-Grossman type of quantity effects. When does a 
macroeconomic model that explicitly takes into account the financial sector exhibit 
multiple equilibria and what is the generic mechanism that causes multiplicity?  This 
question has to be seriously addressed. 
 
Another challenge is to question the rational expectations assumption, amend the model 
by incorporating bounded rational learning rules and examine the history dependent 
dynamics.  
 
A last substantial critique of would argue that a model that does not explain the positive 
value of money as an asset has abstracted too much and misdirected the research 
programme. To keynesians money is not only a source of disturbance due to shocks 
hitting the preference for liquidity but it also has strong propagation properties as well. 
Further their vision encompasses a model (i) with many types of financial assets with 
different degrees of liquidity and risk-return characteristics where money is only of them 
(ii) financial institutions like banks and stock exchanges and central bank policy that 
emerge endogenously within the model. Keeping primarily the last criticism of the Real 
Business Cycle Literature in mind, we turn to the theory of finance to see what relevant 
additional microfoundations can be laid to enrich the RBC paradigm. 
 
2.3 Alternative Frameworks 
Coordination failure models of business cycles (see Cooper and John (1988)) have 
become popular of late. The coordination game is created with strategic 
complementarities and positive spillovers thus generating Keynesian multiplier effects 
and making equilibria pareto ranked. Dynamic coordination games have also been 
proposed to understand phenomena such as delay and cycles (Chamley and Gale (1994)). 
Such frameworks lead to learning models, and deeper understanding of conjectural 
variation games.   Mechanisms which select equilibrium are being explored and recently 
higher order expectations have been identified as a powerful device which does.  
 
A more promising development shows the tendency for researchers to integrate 
informational microproblems into credit markets and try to reinterpret the essence of the 
business cycle problems (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)). 
Much has been learnt here.  
 
 Development of the concept of liquidity into a formal apparatus by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) and Byrant (1980) represented an important breakthrough in business cycle 
analysis, though the full impact is yet to be realized. Others have been finessing the 
concept and Allen and Gale (2001) deserve special mention for integrating the concept 
with the paradigm of general equilibrium theory.   
 
Lastly, mention should be made of endogenous cycle theory and also chaos theory (see 
the survey by Boldrin and Woodford (1990), Farmer and Guo (1992) and Woodford 
(1986)). Using nonlinearities in economic relationships and the notion of self fulfilling 
prophecies, these theorists have tried to explain real and financial data over the business 
cycle. Generating cycles without shocks, the new successors of Goodwin have brought 
back and generalized the notion of the accelerator. 
 
Section 3. The Theory of Financial Mechanisms 
3.1 The Fundamental Problem of Financial Contracting  
Just as one could ask why fiat money with positive value exists, one could ask the same 
thing of other financial instruments like debt, equity, and derivative securities like 
financial futures and options. The nature of the financial contract depends on the risk 
aversion of the parties, limited liability constraints, private information which requires 
screening or signaling etc. Thus one could see debt with rationing by banks, or issue of 
debt as a commitment device or coordination on financial innovation when strategic 
market interaction is taken into account (see Gale and Hellwig (1985), Hart (1995), Allen 
and Gale  (1994)). The financial contracts whether on a cross sectional basis or on an 
intertemporal basis eventually determine the degree of risk bearing and sharing in the 
economy and thus become crucially linked to consumption and investment decisions.  
  
To take a partial equilibrium view, think of an economic agent in need of funds. He can 
be a consumer who wants to borrow against his future income to increase present 
consumption or a firm which wants to make investment in new capital stock and / or 
finance the wage bill for continuing production. The agent seeks funding from a bank or 
the securities market. But the latter group may not know whether the agent can repay the 
loan or pay rich dividends. It is this uncertainty which may prevent the agent from getting 
the finance in the first place. If there were no uncertainty, then there would always be 
efficient allocation of funds to the economic agents who could pay a competitive return 
on the funds lent. In case of uncertainty, consumption or investment can be constrained in 
an inefficient way.  Worthy borrowers may not be able to procure funds since there is no 
way to tell who is worthy and who is not. Usually the borrower will have more 
information about his creditworthiness (the probability of success, the degree of 
management effort in the project or the actual state of return) than the outsider financiers. 
Such a situation is typically known as a situation of asymmetric information or private 
information.  Consider the case of adverse selection credit markets. Since efficient firms 
may be credit rationed and the interest rate will not go up even if firms are credit 
rationed, efficiency warrants that there be ways in which information about the type of 
firms get revealed. Note here that information is an important economic factor here which 
can make a difference in the allocation of scarce resources over competing projects. 
Typically correct information may get revealed if firms and borrowers take some 
strategic actions. Banks can screen borrowers by offering different lending packages 
which different types will choose in a way that one can tell the type of the borrowing firm 
from the lending package chosen. Borrowers can play a signaling game in the sense that 
efficient borrowers may try to send signal their types through their choice of capital 
structure or some other costly action which the inefficient firms cannot find profitable to 
mimic. However, as Rosthchild and Stiglitz (1976) noted, the screening games may not 
necessarily yield efficient outcomes all the time and in fact equilibrium may also fail to 
exist. Signaling games may also generate pooling or non revealing equilibria. Collateral 
can make a difference as shown by Bester (1994). The problem with collateral is of 
course that poor agents without sufficient collateral may not be able to signal their credit 
worthiness or get screened out. This creates inefficiency and can also create persistent 
inequality in wealth and income distribution and lack of occupational mobility causing 
further welfare loss. In general the most efficient way turns out to be monitoring by 
financial intermediaries like banks and mutual funds. Mutual fund participation may be 
constrained by limited participation due to costly delegation. Close monitoring is 
facilitated by relationship banking and can overcome the private information problem. 
However this might lead to soft budget constraints and hold up problems. Further, 
relationship banking is under threat from finance through markets. Therefore, finance 
constraints can play a non negligible role and calls for remedial measures by firms. One 
way is to build up reserve funds. Indeed internal finance is very important today 
compared to external finance. However, it is not easy to build up reserves because it 
requires that under profitable times, some good projects be foregone. But given such a 
program, it undoubtedly reduces the amplitude of cycles. Consider a situation without 
such a program and suppose there is a shock to asset values which reduces the value of 
firm collateral and net worth (see Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) ) such that borrowing constraints begin to bind. This will lead to a cutback in 
investments which can cause a further reduction in asset prices by reducing the demand 
for real assets produced by other sectors and / or generating panics in financial markets.  
With reserves in place, the credit constraint has a lower probability of binding and thus 
causing an adverse chain reaction. The tradeoff is of course that capital accumulation of 
the economy will proceed at a slower rate. The time preference and risk aversion of the 
economic agents will be crucial in determining the optimal tradeoff. 
 
3.2 Money and Finance in General Equilibrium Theory under Uncertainty 
Finance, from the GE perspective, is the analysis of the role of financial assets in 
bringing about an efficient allocation of scarce resources. Consider the Arrow-Debreu 
Model of general equilibrium under uncertainty. As long as state contingent trades are 
possible, there is no role for financial assets. However, if such state contingent 
commodity contracts are not possible to make due to the complexity and transaction costs 
associated with such trade and only spot markets are present, the same efficient allocation 
can be reached by a set of financial assets whose return vector are such that they span all 
the states of nature. One example of this is the set of arrow securities (see Arrow, K. J. 
(1964) ) where each such security exists for each state of nature and gives a return of one 
unit of the numeraire good.   
 
When the set of linearly independent vector of asset returns do not span all the states of 
nature, markets are said to be incomplete. Under incomplete markets agents cannot get 
insurance against some set of states of nature and are therefore constrained in their 
consumption or investment decisions. There exists conditions under which welfare could 
be improved through wealth redistribution (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)). 
This has a direct implication for macroeconomics. Consider for example the Scheinkman 
and Weiss (1986) story with two agents who are heterogenous in the sense that 
productivity shocks are negatively correlated and at any point and only one is productive. 
This gives rise to the demand for durable goods that can be exchanged for consumption 
goods. The distribution of initial wealth affects the stochastic path of output in this 
economy and redistribution could theoretically atleast, lead to Pareto improvements.   
 
Another consequence of incomplete markets may be that there exists a role for money in 
a general equilibrium model. Consider an example where there are two consumers, one 
consumption good, two states of nature and two dates. The first consumer has one unit of 
good one at date 1 and none at the second date. The second consumer has one unit of the 
consumption good at date 2 and none in the first period. Suppose they value consumption 
in each period equally. If trade was possible the first consumer would exchange half unit 
of the consumption good at date 1 for the promise of an equal amount of consumption 
good at date 2 with the second consumer. However, there is the possibility that second 
consumer will not fulfill his promise at date 2 after the he gets his share of consumption 
at date 1. If such a situation of lack of trust is present, trade may will not take place at 
date 1. As shown ingenuously by Gale (1982), money may turn out to be a perfectly 
substitute for trust and restore the efficient allocation. Consider the government printing 
out one unit of indivisible money and demanding it back at the end of the second period. 
Now agent two can finance his first period consumption with money since agent 1 will 
have a positive demand for money in date 1. The positive demand results from the fact 
that agent 1 knows that agent 2 will need to have money in the second date in order to 
return the same to the government. Therefore it implies that agent 1 can finance his 
consumption at date 2 with money successfully. More generally, under incomplete 
markets there will be a positive demand for money at date 1 since that is the only way 
consumers can finance their consumption in the uninsurable states at date 2 (and 
onwards).  This is a powerful insight which can significantly enrich the real business 
cycle paradigm. Whenever asset markets are incomplete, financial innovation has a 
chance to occur and may increase the risk taking in the macroeconomy. 
 
To develop a serious monetary model one should be able not only to show the existence 
of money but also how the quantity of money matters. In particular, one should be able to 
find the optimal monetary policy rule in such a model : whether non stochastic monetary 
policy is better than a fixed money supply (growth) rule, the optimal real rate of interest, 
and also address the debate between active (discretionary) versus rule based monetary 
policy. Fortunately, Lucas (1972) has shown in a rational expectations framework how to 
address such questions. In his model, there are real shocks which are temporary and 
money shocks which are permanent. Individuals see only prices but not the shocks. If 
they knew the structure of shocks they would adjust to the real ones only but they don’t. 
There exists a stationary rational expectations price function which may not be fully 
revealing the structure of underlying shocks and thus agents would react to money shocks 
producing positive correlation between money and output. The message of Lucas is that a 
non stochastic money supply rule allows agents to decipher the real shocks perfectly and 
therefore keep the economy on the optimal path. This is in fact, one of the reasons why 
money is absent in the real business cycle paradigm  – it implicitly recognizes the 
optimality of a rule based monetary policy. However, Azariadis (1981) has shown that a 
stochastic monetary policy may dominate a completely non stochastic one. He uses a 
variation of the argument of second best theorems: when there already exists distortions 
(due to inability to decipher different types of real shocks for example), removing another 
distorting factor (stochastic element in the money supply rule) may cause welfare losses.  
The challenge here is to incorporate the intuition and get a richer quantitative idea about 
stochastic policy by incorporating money and modifying the RBC paradigm. 
 
Another way to model money is by focusing on the liquidity property. Suppose there are 
three dates 0 1 and 2. Suppose at date zero a representative consumer faces the 
uncertainty of whether he needs to consume more at date 1 or date 2. Typically, under 
this situation he will keep part of his savings in a safe liquid asset which can yield a 
consumption at date 1. This can be thought of as money (note that it is precautionary 
demand for money which is important here). The other part of savings can be kept in an 
asset which yields higher return but is illiquid (like long term bonds without a good 
secondary market). Diamond and Dybvig shows that financial intermediaries offering 
deposit contracts can insure against liquidity uncertainty faced by the consumers using 
the law of large numbers effectively. That is if the bank knows the proportion of early 
consumers, then it can invest in the safe asset in an amount which exactly meets their 
withdrawal demand from the bank at date 1. While this a useful paradigm in its own 
right, it may not be easy to integrate this paradigm with the RBC type of macroeconomic 
story. There are two possible approaches. The first is to assume a stochastic discount 
factor as creating liquidity or intertemporal demand shocks in the representative agent 
economy. The second and the harder way to do this would require heterogenous 
consumers and breaking each time-period in two parts. Each consumer is maximizing the 
welfare from the stream of consumption in each period and also deciding his savings 
portfolio in light of the uncertainty whether to consume early or late during each period. 
The important question is whether liquidity uncertainty matters in terms of cycles. If 
there is an expectation of adverse liquidity shock then what are the implications for 
business cycles? Here is a plausible story: Agents can switch to portfolios which are more 
flexible like bank deposits. However, if the return on bank deposits are low then it can 
cause a reduction in aggregate savings and therefore investment. As a result the output 
will be lower next period. What can policy do to improve the state of affairs? If the 
problem stems from increasing returns and monopoly elements in banking then 
regulating the rate of return on banking through competition and interest rate policy may 
turn out to be welfare enhancing. Higher deposit rates may lead to higher aggregate 
savings primarily in the form of bank deposits and can be translated into investment. 
However, the problem may not stem only from structural factors in banking, even with 
competitive banking the deposit rate would be low due to higher supply.  
 
In the debate between banks versus markets a key concept is limited participation by 
investors. Investors are averse to risk and participate less in trading when there is greater 
risk. As a result the investors who are participating and need to liquidate will find a thin 
market and low price for the assets they want to sell. This will make investment in short 
term assets more attractive. As a result, under direct finance the investment in fixed 
capital is low. Under bank financing, the investors are guaranteed of a return and 
participate more. The liquidity problem is directly taken care of by banks.   So the 
question is how banks design their asset portfolios. Banks will not have a tendency to 
hold excessive short assets beyond what is required to cover the depositor needs provided 
banks are not facing the liquidation problem also. It depends on what the investors in the 
market are doing. Will they buy securities like bonds and equity? If they do banks will 
hold long term assets more. An interesting question is whether monetary policy changes 
the relative attractiveness of equity or bonds issued by firms. A monetary policy which 
stabilizes interest rates under a rational expectations equilibrium can protect the buyers of 
credit derivatives. Another possibility is that participating agents can acquire superior 
information about directly issued securities. If that is so then they need to have an 
incentive to acquire information and that condition turns out to be non revealing 
equilibrium. As we know already, a stochastic monetary policy can create non revealing 
equilibria. So a stochastic monetary policy can increase participation in markets, and 
raise the efficiency of direct as well as indirect finance and have counter cyclical 
properties in the sense that economic agents will have less incentive to hoard liquid assets 
faced with a liquidity shock.  
    
As mentioned before, financial innovation can be profitable for financial institutions and 
firms in economies with incomplete asset markets. However, it is also true that financial 
innovation can increase risk taking. In the last two decades, a literature has developed in  
the field of finance claiming that securitization was an efficient mechanism that allowed 
better risks to buy more credit enhancements and increase welfare for the buyer as well as 
the seller (see in particular Greenbaum, S. and A.V. Thakor (1987)). The problem that we 
cannot reconcile such a view today stems from the fact that those models were partial 
equilibrium and not general equilibrium or macroeconomic models. In particular, while 
partial equilibrium analysis showed that financial transactions were of win-win nature, 
the general equilibrium or macro analysis can show that the same set of transactions 
could be win-lose in nature due to changing asset returns structure as a result of herding. 
This is the biggest challenge in integrating the fields of finance and business cycle 
analysis.  
 
Section 4. Conclusion 
In this conclusion I shall dwell on two things – first, a short review of the recent financial 
crisis in USA and second, an outline of a research agenda on integrating finance with 
business cycle theory. 
 
When we observe past consumption data in the US, we see considerable amount of 
consumption smoothing. On the other hand, when we see data at the firm level, there is 
significant evidence of credit constraints, especially for the small and new borrowers. 
This implies that while the credit system does not encourage too much savings at the 
level of the households it encourages asset accumulation for the firms. There are two 
implications of this: one, that if there is a sudden systemic shock which leads to a credit 
crunch the households would not be able to keep up their consumption spending and two, 
there would exist a financial accelerator in the market for working and fixed capital 
credit. Internal Funds and Reserves would be important for firms in this scenario as firms 
would like to hedge against a credit crunch. With a strong assets market the asset prices 
would be high if there is high liquidity in the system. The demand for liquidity insurance 
from households will be low since they would prefer high valued assets. Participation 
would thus be high in asset markets. But excess liquidity would lead to speculation and 
bubbles in asset markets. Correlation of asset returns result in the euphoria and 
institutions holding these assets become vulnerable. Then comes a bursting of the bubble 
and the consequent shakeouts like firesales of assets and bankruptcies. The interbank 
lending freezes, liquidity trap develops and credit crunch becomes a reality. In the next 
round, consumption finance is restricted by financial institutions struggling to meet their 
liabilities. Historians will argue for years why the investment banks did not cover their 
risk on securitization but it remains true that finance is a dangerous game with incomplete 
markets and systemic risk going hand in hand. The crises of 2007 (sub-prime) and 2008 
(investment banking) are so large and sudden that any appeal to rational expectations 
based self-fulfilling prophecies is bound to mislead and it seems to this author that animal 
spirits will make a comeback in short run analysis of aggregate economic activity through 
a focus on partially revealing equilibria. 
 
Coming to the second issue, to understand money and finance in a non-trivial fashion one 
has to begin with a sequence economy with some degree of market imperfections such as 
incompleteness. The first alteration one needs to the RBC model is to bring in strategic 
agents and study the dynamic pattern of trade between the agents. It has to be a 
heterogenous agents economy where time is discrete (may be continuous within period 
for more ambitious work), preferences are defined over goods and leisure over time with 
a discount factor which is driven by a stochastic process and a neoclassical-austrian 
technology (one can bring in externalities and re-switching elements if they are deemed 
important) with labour (whose efficiency is growing at an exponential rate) and capital 
and a stochastic process hitting the aggregate production function.  
 
The Government (Fiscal and Monetary Arms, coordinating or not), the financial markets 
and the financial intermediaries have to specified such that they arise from the primitives 
of the time-taste-technology primitives. To begin with, we want to understand the 
financial constraints and the welfare policy of the Government. Therefore it is best to 
treat the fiscal and monetary policy stemming from a common source with no 
coordination problems. An open ended structure is best with respect to financial markets 
if we want to deal seriously with the incomplete markets phenomenon. What about 
financial intermediaries? They should be modelled so that they can range from 
commercial banks to mutual funds to derivatives exchanges. This can create cross 
sectional complexities when we want to confront the financial structure data but in 
general a common specification can work quite well. Participation in markets and 
competition between intermediaries can be an important issue and it is clear that full 
participation and perfect competition can be misleading. The best strategy is to let the 
degree of competition be an exogenous parameter and allow participation to be an 
endogenous variable. 
 
A basic objection with the representative model lies in the specification of the source of 
the shock to the economy. Technological shocks have produced growth and as a variable 
productivity shock is an important candidate in cycles since it has created technological 
booms with persistence. However, it did not produce the Great Depression, or the Latin 
American, Russian or the East Asian Crises nor can it be blamed for the recent US 
recession. In fact, monetary and financial disturbances have been argued by many as the 
shocks in all of these periods crises. Dissenting arguments find themselves more 
acceptable by characterizing these crises as self fulfilling prophecies rather than 
situations where economies dipped in response to some shocks to fundamentals. A 
reconciliation would be to examine the vulnerability of the financial sector where in 
financial markets agents play a game which is a coordination game and where equilibria 
is not generically revealing. The coordination game would produce partially self fulfilling 
prophecies. Further, financial market interlinkage must be brought about by the model by 
considering the currency markets, stocks and derivatives, and financial intermediary 
contracts.  
 
Due to forward looking character of the model, asset prices will be leading the cycle 
whether or not signals are extracted from the financial markets efficiently. When 
financial markets are efficient, fluctuations will be optimal but if not, bubbles and crashes 
may jeopardize the market economy and weaken it’s resilience. Another aspect is 
overshooting or undershooting in financial markets. The conditions which create these 
have to be investigated within the structure or framework of the model. The most 
interesting question is what kind of correlations do financial and real variables have over 
the different phases of business cycle. Does monetary injections have better effectiveness 
in bust than booms? Why? 
 
The main issue remains the efficacy of demand management policy. It would be unwise 
to treat it as a closed chapter and jump to models which blur the distinction between the 
demand and the supply side as some of the New Classical macroeconomists have done 
and been routinely doing. Decentralizability is trivial in a representative agent economy 
with convexity of preferences and technology. It is non trivial when the different sectors 
of the economy take decisions of their own. This simple point has been conveniently and 
regrettably forgotten. Lessons from undergraduate macroeconomics give us the first idea 
about how business cycle occurs in such a truly decentralized system. The feedback 
between firm investment decisions and household expenditure decisions can amplify 
shocks and the automatic stabilizers built into the system makes sure that stability is 
guaranteed.  However, such cycles can be costly when agents are risk averse. This is the 
first step in the micro foundation of macroeconomics which clearly indicates that 
countercyclical policy should be pursued if it is effective. It is a big if however, and one 
now has to remember all the sublime messages of policy neutrality passed on by 
generations of anti-interventionist economists. The first thing to remember is the Lucas 
Critique: when a policy is pursued, the systematic component is internalized by rational 
agents which can reduce the efficacy of policy. However, policy may still play a role. 
Suppose that in the rational expectations equilibrium framework policy interacts with 
agents decisions and we have multiple equilibria. The selection of the equilibira, if 
random, can exhibit policy effectiveness over a subset of such equilibria. Secondly, 
policy itself can help select the equilibrium. It is plausible however, that due to 
restrictions on the policy maker through its budget constraints, the effectiveness of policy 
may be circumscribed and bounded. The real task then is to understand the nature of the 
boundedness in an appropriately designed model. A related goal is to understand the 
relations and the relative efficacy of different policy instruments either fiscal or monetary 
and treat policy in a comprehensive rather than piecemeal manner. Modeling should tell 
us how to characterize optimal policy not only in terms of different components but also 
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